COMMENT
COERCION, BLACKMAIL, AND THE LIMITS OF
PROTECTED SPEECH
The Oregon Supreme Court recently reviewed the constitutionality
of that state's criminal coercion statute.' The Oregon statute made it a
felony to induce a person to sacrifice any legal right by threatening to
engage in certain types of conduct. A threat such as "Vote Republican
or I will burn your house down" fell within the statute's proscription.
In an opinion by Judge Linde, the court in State v. Robertson2 struck
down the Oregon criminal coercion statute as an abridgement of free
speech.' The invalidated statute bore a striking resemblance to the typi1

OR. REv. STAT.

§ 163.275 (1981). The statute provides:

(1) A person commits the crime of coercion when he compels or
induces another person to engage in conduct from which he has a legal
right to abstain, or to abstain from engaging in conduct in which he has a
legal right to engage, by means of instilling in him a fear that, if the
demand is not complied with, the actor or another will:
(a) Cause physical injury to some person; or
(b) Cause damage to property; or
(c) Engage in other conduct constituting a crime; or
(d) Accuse some person of a crime or cause criminal charges
to be instituted against him; or
(e) Expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true
or false, tending to subject some person to hatred, contempt or ridicule; or
(f) Cause or continue a strike, boycott or other collective action injurious to some person's business, except that such a threat
shall not be deemed coercive when the act or omission compelled is
for the benefit of the group in whose interest the actor purports to
act; or
(g) Testify or provide information or withhold testimony or
information with respect to another's legal claim or defense; or
(h) Use or abuse his position as a public servant by performing some act within or related to his official duties, or by failing or
refusing to perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect
some person adversely; or
(i) Inflict any harm which would not benefit the actor.
(2) Coercion is a Class C felony.
For a comparable coercion statute, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5 (1980).
2 293 Or. 402, 649 P.2d 569 (1982).
3 The holding in Robertson is based solely on the Oregon Constitution. Differences between Oregon free speech interpretations and federal interpretations are beyond the scope of this Comment. The Robertson analysis relevant to this Comment
follows principles of free speech applicable to federal constitutional analysis. For a
compilation of recent sources on state constitutional litigation and its import, see Devel-
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cal blackmail statute,4 which proscribes the use of threats to obtain the
property of others. "Pay me $5000 or I will burn your house down" is
an example of restricted blackmail speech. The Robertson court suggested that it would have reached a different conclusion had it been
required to pass upon the constitutionality of a blackmail statute.'
Judge Linde noted that "Uj]udicial and academic analyses of the
principles governing freedom to make demands coupled with threats
have been sparse and inconclusive . . . yield[ing] no principled guid-

ance."' Nevertheless, he had "no doubt" that blackmail statutes would
survive first amendment scrutiny on "historic grounds alone." In striking down the criminal coercion statute, however, he explained that
"[w]hen extending an old crime to wider 'subjects' . . . there is need
for care that the extension does not leave its historical analogue behind
and... reach instances of privileged expression."'
This Comment argues that Judge Linde was correct to conclude
both that first amendment principles restrict the scope of criminal coercion statutes and that blackmail statutes may constitutionally reach further than criminal coercion statutes. Part I sets forth the permissible
scope of a criminal coercion statute. In Part II, this Comment proffers
optRnents in the Law-The Interpretationof State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARv. L.
Riv. 1324, 1328 n.20 (1982).
4 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (1980). The statute provides:
A person is guilty of theft if he purposely obtains property of another
by threatening to:
(1) inflict bodily injury on anyone or commit any other criminal offense; or
(2) accuse anyone of a criminal offense; or
(3) expose any secret tending to subject any person to hatred,
contempt or ridicule, or to impair his credit or business repute; or
(4) take or withhold action as an official, or cause an official
to take or withhold action; or
(5) bring about or continue a strike, boycott or other collective unofficial action, if the property is not demanded or received for
the benefit of the group in whose interest the actor purports to act;
or
(6) testify or provide information or withhold testimony or
information with respect to another's legal claim or defense; or
(7) inflict any other harm which would not benefit the actor.
It is an affirmative defense to prosecution based on paragraphs
(2), (3) or (4) that the property obtained by threat of accusation,
exposure, lawsuit or other invocation of official action was honestly
claimed as restitution or indemnification for harm done in the circumstances to which such accusation, exposure, lawsuit or other official action relates, or as compensation for property or lawful
services.
* See 649 P.2d at 581.
* Id. at 587.
Id. at 581.
• Id. at 589.
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commercial speech doctrine rather than history as a justification for
permitting legislatures greater leeway in enacting blackmail statutes.
I.

COERCIVE SPEECH

"Coercive speech"-speech forcing the listener to choose between
two things when the listener has a legitimate claim to both
things-should fall outside the protections of the first amendment.
While this concept permits legislatures to enact both criminal coercion
and blackmail statutes proscribing some threats, it does not justify such
statutes that operate in other areas.
A.

The Unprotected Nature of Coercive Speech

Speech is protected generally not only because it promotes certain
essential values,' but also because it operates to promote those values in
a particular way.10 Protected speech "create[s] an effect by influencing
the mind-the perceptions, feelings, beliefs or understandings-of the
listener." ' Other activities, though they may advance the same values
as does speech, do so by other means. For example, some could find
self-fulfillment by forcing others to dance through the use of gunfire,
and some could work toward social change by assassinating political
leaders. Because of the means used to achieve these valued ends, however, these activities are not protected.
Like unprotected activity, speech that forces the listener to choose
between two things, both of which the listener has a right to
claim-"coercive speech" 12-acts on the listener in a different way
from protected speech.1 As Professor Baker has argued, speech that
9 Professor Emerson provides a description of these values. He notes that "a system of free expression" serves "(1) as assuring individual self-fulfillment, (2) as a
means of attaining the truth, (3) as a method of securing participation by the members
of society in social, including political, decision-making, and (4) as maintaining the
balance between stability and change in the society." Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 878-79 (1963). Professor Baker believes that Emerson's list boils down to two central free speech values, individual selffulfillment and participation in change. Baker, Scope of the FirstAmendment Freedom
of Speech, 25 UCLA L. Rv. 964, 991-92 (1978).
10 See generally Baker, supra note 9, at 997-1009.
11 Id. at 997 (parenthetical omitted).
12 Scholars who have considered the concept of coercion differ as to the meaning of
the term. Compare Nozick, Coercion, in PMLOSOPHY, ScIENcE, AND METHOD -EsSAYS IN HONOR OF ERNEST NAGEL 440 (1969) with Frankfurt, Coercion and Moral
Responsibility, in ESSAYS ON FREEDOM OF ACTION 63 (T. Honderich ed. 1973) and
McCloskey, Coercion: Its Nature and Significance, 18 S.J. PHIL. 335 (1980).
IsFor the purposes of this analysis, a listener's legitimate rights are regarded as
identical to the listener's legal rights.
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purposely changes another's options "such that the other is worse off
than he would be if he had the options that he had a. . . legitimate
right to expect" 14 should not be protected by the first amendment. Such
speech purposely forces a choice by resort to actual or apparent power
over the listener. To the extent the speaker has the power to force the
choice, coercive speech operates as illegitimate compulsion. If the
speaker lacks such power but purposely uses apparent power to force
the choice, this speech, too, operates as illegitimate compulsion.
Speech that forces a choice the listener would prefer not to make is
not coercive simply because it manipulates the listener's options to his
detriment, however. The issue is whether the speech actually reduces a
listener's legitimate options. For this reason, speech with the purpose of
forcing a listener's choice between two things, where the listener has a
legitimate right to only one (or none) of the things, makes the listener
no worse off than he has a legitimate right to expect. The speech thus
does not have the same impact on the listener's autonomy as coercive
speech does and therefore should be protected because of its potential
benefit to the speaker.1 5
B.

Regulation of Coercive Speech

This theory of coercive' speech justifies certain aspects of both
criminal coercion and blackmail statutes. Other aspects of such statutes,
however, go beyond the regulation permitted by the coercive speech
theory.
A coercive speech analysis would justify prosecution of a gangster
under a criminal coercion statute if the gangster threatened to break a
14 Id. For discussion of coercive speech that targets a listener's legal but illegitimate rights, see Baker, supra note 9, at 999.
11 For a discussion of the benefits of self-expression, see supra note 9. At this
point, the analysis in this Comment departs from Professor Baker's. The coercive
speech analysis in this text omits a second category of speech included in Professor
Baker's analysis. He argues that a "person coercively influences another if ... she
employs means that she had no right to use for changing" the listener's "options (e.g.,
blackmail)." Id. Professor Baker recognizes, however, that "reliance on law to specify"
such means "can be circular." Id. He explains:
Suppose Joe tells [his] Senator that he will continue his protests until the
Senator supports the Equal Rights Amendment. To conclude that Joe has
coerced the Senator because a law gives the Senator a right to be free from
the protests is circular if Joe's protests can be legitimately outlawed only if
the protests are coercive. If only coercive aspects of the speech can justify
making the speech illegal, the speech's illegality cannot support the view
that it is coercive. The prohibition itself cannot justify the prohibition.
Id. at 999-1000. Given this inherent circularity, this Comment adopts the view that the
means employed to change a listener's options should be characterized as coercive only
if those means can be outlawed on grounds independent of their coercive effect.
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tavern owner's legs unless he voted for a certain political candidate. 16
The threat forces the tavern owner to choose between two things-the
right to be free from physical assault and the right to vote according to
individual conscience-when the tavern owner has a legitimate claim to
both things.17 Likewise the gangster could be prosecuted under a blackmail statute for threatening to break the tavern owner's legs unless he
paid the gangster $200 per week, for the tavern owner has a right both
to his money and to his limbs.1 8 The same analysis would apply in the
preceding examples if the gangster's threat had been to destroy the tavern owner's property.1 9 Under the coercive speech analysis, a blackmail
or criminal coercion statute is valid to the extent that it proscribes the
threat to commit a crime or a tort intended to induce the listener to
abandon a legal right.20
Coercive speech analysis, however, does not justify blackmail or
criminal coercion statutes to the extent that they proscribe threats to
commit an act 2" that is neither a crime nor a tort. 2 Such threats cannot
force the listener to choose between two things, to both of which the
listener has a legitimate claim, since the listener has no right to be free
from conduct that constitutes neither a crime nor a tort. For example, if
a gangster threatens to notify police that a tavern owner illegally serves
minors unless the tavern owner votes for a certain political candidate,"
or pays the gangster $200 per week," coercive speech analysis does not
1.

16

OR.

REv. STAT. §

163.275(1)(a) (1981) proscribes this threat. See supra note

17 Of course, where the threat is to do injury.to "some person" other than the
listener, it is the right of the third person that would be directly violated by the injury.
Still, the listener has a stake in the third person's right; otherwise the speaker would
not have made the threat.
'a MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4(1)(a) (1980) proscribes this threat. See supra
note 4.
, See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 163.275(1)(b) (1981) (criminal coercion), quoted
supra note 1; MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4(1) (1980) (blackmail), quoted supra note
4.
20 For provisions couched in terms of the criminal nature of the threatened act, see
OR. REv STAT. § 163.275(1)(c) (1981); MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4(1) (1980). In
State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569, 588-90 (Or. 1982), Judge Linde suggested that even
a criminal coercion statute proscribing only threatened crimes or torts would be
unconstitutional.
21 The criminality of the conduct that the threatener induces is irrelevant to this
analysis. Noncoercive speech that induces another to commit a crime must be analyzed

as solicitation. See Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 4 AM. B. FOUND.

645, 655-70 (1980).

REsEARcH

J.

22 Speech that cannot be restricted as coercive might, of course, be restricted on
other grounds-for example, as libelous.
13 OR. REv. STAT. § 163.275(1)(d) (1981) proscribes this conduct. See supra note
1.
24 MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4(2) (1980) proscribes this conduct. See supra note

4.

1474

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 131:1469

justify prosecution of the gangster. While the tavern owner has a right
to vote his conscience and to keep his money, the tavern owner has no
right not to be charged accurately with a crime. If such conduct is to be
proscribed, something other than coercive speech analysis must provide
the justification.

II. BLACKMAIL
Unlike criminal coercion statutes, blackmail statutes restrict only
commercial speech.2' Commercial speech doctrine justifies those restrictions on speech imposed by blackmail statutes but not justified by coercive speech analysis.
A. Blackmail As Commercial Speech
The United States Supreme Court has always recognized that
"[t]here are commonsense differences between speech that does 'no
more than propose a commercial transaction,' . . . and other varieties." While criminal coercion statutes reach speech other than commercial speech (because they can be violated when nothing of economic
value is at issue), the typical blackmail transaction involves commercial
speech.
Recent Supreme Court cases in the commercial speech realm draw
a distinction between speech having the purpose of simply increasing
the speaker's wealth and speech having an ideological purpose.2 7 The
Court has stated that commercial speech is "distinguished by its content." But in distinguishing speech's "content," the Court considers
many factors' to determine the purpose of the speech. This becomes
clear by comparing two cases that were decided by the Court on the
s Of course, a criminal coercion statute might be construed as applying to the sort
of conduct normally thought of as blackmail. Thus construed, such a statute would be

justified by a commercial speech analysis. In this Comment, the potential for this overlap in coverage is ignored to simplify presentation of the argument.
s Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 771-72 n.24 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973).
" A similar distinction has been framed in terms of substantive and instrumental
values. See Baker, Commercial Speech. A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IowA
L. REv. 1, 14 (1976). Something valued substantively is valued in and of itself and is
not commercial. Something valued instrumentally, like money, is valued instead for
something external to itself.
" Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 761 (1976).
"Professor Baker discusses a category of commercial speech which is distinguished by its "source." Baker, supra note 27, at 14. The source of speech is one factor
to consider in determining whether speech has a commercial purpose.

19831

1475

COERCION, BLACKMAIL, AND FREE SPEECH

same day: Ohralik v. Ohio State BarAssociation"0 and In re Primus.3A
In Ohralik, the Court upheld a prophylactic regulation against in-person solicitation of clients by lawyers "for pecuniary gain."' 2 The lawyer in Ohralik had obtained contingent-fee arrangements from two accident victims. In Primus, the Court refused to extend the Ohralik role
to a lawyer's soliciting clients on behalf of the ACLU when the solicitation "further[ed] political and ideological goals through associational
activity." 3 3
The Supreme Court considered the totality of the circumstances in
both Ohralik and Primus. The Ohralik Court noted that appellant

approached two young accident victims at a time when they
were especially incapable of making informed judgments
* .
He employed a concealed tape recorder, seemingly to
insure that he would have evidence of. . . oral assent to the
representation. He emphasized that his fee would come out
of the recovery, thereby tempting the young women ....
[And he] refused to withdraw when . . . requested
do so only a day after the initial meeting. . ...

. . .

to

All of this tended to show that "on the facts of this case [appellant]
could not contend, that his approaches to the two young women involved political expression or an exercise of associational freedom.""
The purpose of Ohralik's speech was commercial.
The Primus Court, on the other hand, noted that "ACLU sponsorship of litigation" is generally recognized as having-the "goal of vindicating civil liberties." ' It held that the rules "appropriate in the case
of speech that simply 'propose[s] a commercial transaction'" may be
inappropriate in "the context of political expression and association."' 7
When, as in Primus, an attorney offers free representation in an ideological context, the fact that the ACLU may benefit from courtawarded fees does not lower the "level of constitutional scrutiny.""
In Ohralik the purpose of the speech was commercial, and in
Primus the purpose was ideological; therefore, the speech in Primus
- 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (disciplinary rule against solicitation of clients upheld as
applied to a lawyer soliciting for pecuniary gain).
31 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (disciplinary rule against solicitation held invalid as applied to offer of legal services by ACLU lawyer).
2 Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449.
3' Primus, 436 U.S. at 414.
3 Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 467.
Id. at 458 (emphasis added).
" Primus, 436 U.S. at 430.
37

3

Id. at 437-38.
Id. at 428.
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received greater protection than the commercial speech in Ohralik. 9
The Court admits that "[t]he line, based in part on the motive of the
speaker and the character of the expressive activity, will not always be
easy to draw," but it concludes that "that is no reason for avoiding the
undertaking."'4
Blackmail falls within the category of speech with a commercial
purpose. The essence of the crime is the speaker's demand for something of economic value. A threat demanding nothing, or demanding
something of no economic value, is outside the scope of a blackmail
statute. Only communications with the purpose of demanding something of economic value are inhibited by blackmail laws.4 1 Blackmail
laws are thus subject to analysis under commercial speech doctrine.
B. ProscribingBlackmail
As commercial speech, blackmail is entitled to less protection than
is normally afforded speech. While coercive speech analysis does not
justify some provisions of blackmail laws, commercial speech analysis
justifies those provisions, giving blackmail statutes a broader permissible scope than criminal coercion statutes. Commercial speech doctrine
permits legislatures to proscribe blackmail in which the threatened act
itself is neither a crime nor a tort. Legislatures may proscribe blackmail
regardless of whether the proposed transaction itself has been
outlawed.4 2
11 Justice Rehnquist argues that there is no principled distinction between Primus
and Ohralik. He suggests "that the next lawyer in Ohralik's shoes. . . will come here
cloaked in the prescribed mantle of 'political association' to assure that insurance companies do not take unfair advantage of policyholders." Id. at 442 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
40 Primus, 436 U.S. at 438 n.32 (emphasis added).
41 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (1980), quoted supra note 4; State v.
Felton, 399 So. 2d 797 (La. 1976) (blackmail law violated when threats used to force
sexual relations).
"' Commentators have disagreed about whether blackmail transactions should be
outlawed. Compare M. ROTHBARD, 1 MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE 443 n.49 (1962)
("blackmail would not be illegal in a free society" because it is "non-violent") and
Murphy, Blackmail: A PreliminaryInquiry, 63 MONIST 156, 157-58 (blackmail may
be a "non-deviant" economic transaction in a free economy) with R. Nozicx, ANARCiY, STATE AND UTOPIA 84-86 (1974) (blackmail is an "unproductive" transaction
and has no claim to protection in a libertarian society) and Williams, Blackmail, 1954
CiuM. L. REv. 79, 163 ("two things [which] taken separately are moral and legal
whites make a moral and legal black").
Murphy urges consideration of "a whole range of economic transactions" before
deciding that blackmail should be outlawed.
Such an examination will have an impact on some deep ideological divisions within social philosophy-e.g., on the conflict between Libertarians
(who argue that any economic transaction between consenting adults, in-
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1. Blackmail Proposing a Prohibited Act
Blackmail proposes a commercial transaction-for example, the
trading of money for an agreement to refrain from certain conduct.
States may outlaw such transactions. If they do, then prohibition of
blackmail itself is justified under commercial speech doctrine as the
prohibition of speech proposing an illegal commercial transaction.
States have broad range to enact economic legislation for the public welfare:
[I]n the absence of [a specific] constitutional restriction, a
state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that
policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are
without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is
declared by the legislature, to override it.48
Thus, a legislative decision to outlaw blackmail transactions, absent any
lurking first amendment problem, will be accorded judicial deference.
A complication arises, however, when the blackmailer threatens
protected speech as the sanction in the blackmail transaction. This
speech differs from speech involved in the offer to engage in a blackmail
transaction, which is implicated irrespective of the threatened sanction.
When protected speech is part of the transaction itself, on the other
hand, the first amendment is implicated on a second level by the proscription of the blackmail transaction. The blackmail threat, "Pay me
$5000 or I will burn your house down," implicates speech only at the
first level. Burning down a house is not speech-related. The blackmail
threat, "Pay me $5000 or I will reveal information about your sordid
past," implicates speech on a second level.
It could be argued that any attempt to outlaw speech-related
transactions runs afoul of free speech principles. For example, though
legislatures may regulate the sale of milk," it is quite another thing to
prohibit the sale of newspapers.4 This argument presumably would
cluding blackmail, should be allowed) and Marxists (who argue that all
capitalistic economic transactions should, because they are really blackmail, be prohibited). There is a sense ... in which Libertarians and
Marxists agree on something quite basic-namely that the blackmail

transaction is a nondeviant transaction within a capitalistic economic
system.
Murphy, supra, at 157-58 (footnote omitted).
4' Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) (New York's milk price control
regulations upheld).
"See id.
45

See Baker, Press Rights and Government Power to Structure the Press, 34 U.
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prevent proscription of the blackmail transaction when it includes the
threat of protected speech.
This argument is invalid for two reasons. First, the sale of newspapers deserves special protection under the first amendment press
clause.4 Second, the blackmail transaction, unlike the newspaper transaction, does not have a communicative purpose. The blackmailer uses
the threat of communication only as a sanction to obtain property. It is
irrelevant to the blackmailer whether the communication occurs. The
purpose of a blackmail statute is to eliminate this acommunicative
transaction. Because legislation with such a purpose is consistent with
principles of free speech, blackmail transactions may be proscribed.
If the blackmail transaction is outlawed, precedent indicates that
offers to engage in it are unprotected. In PittsburghPress Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations,47 the Court upheld a city ordinance forbidding sex-designated advertising of jobs for which sex discrimination was prohibited. The Supreme Court held that "[a]ny First
Amendment interest which might be served by advertising an ordinary
commercial proposal. . . is altogether absent when the commercial activity itself is illegal and the restriction on advertising is incidental to a
valid limitation on economic activity."4 s
Whether the underlying commercial transaction proposed by
blackmail has been proscribed in a particular jurisdiction is a matter of
statutory interpretation. For example, the Model Penal Code provides
that "[a] person is guilty of theft if he purposely obtains property of
another" by employing threats. 49 A statute in this form outlaws the
blackmail transaction. Because the completed transaction violates the
commercial proscription, speech proposing the transaction may be restricted under PittsburghPress.
L. REv. 819 (1980).
46 The Supreme Court has noted that the press merits special protection.

MrAMI

The Constitution specifically selected the press, which includes not only
newspapers, books, and magazines, but also humble leaflets and circulars,
...to play an important role in the discussion of public affairs. Thus the
press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any
abuses of power by governmental officials ....
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (citation omitted) (statute proscribing election-day newspaper editorials concerning candidates or referendums held invalid); see
Baker, supra note 45, at 822-36.
47 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
4s Id. at 389.
49 MODEL PENAL.CODE § 223.4 (1980), quoted supra note 4.
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2.

Blackmail Proposing a Legal Act

The blackmail laws in some states, however, do not outlaw the
proposed commercial transaction. These states "treat as the substantive
crime of extortion the making of certain specified threats for the purpose of obtaining property."50 The transaction is not designated as illegal, but the speech involved in the transaction is proscribed. Such
blackmail statutes should be upheld.
Although PittsburghPress could be read as holding that commercial speech has no speech value,51 the Court rejected that view in Virginia State Board of Pharmacyv. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 2 holding that consumers have a first amendment right to receive
advertising or other affirmative dissemination of prescription drug price
information.5" Read together, Pittsburgh Press and Virginia Pharmacy
establish that commercial speech has a lower-level speech value. The
value lies in the possibility that commercial speech will provide listeners with information to assist them in making competitive market decisions. That value is small when the speech informs listeners about illegal transactions, and the state's interest in regulating speech is
substantial in this context. In Pittsburgh Press the value of the speech
was outweighed by the valid state interest in enforcing its decision to
outlaw the commercial transaction. In Virginia Phariaqy,the balance
tipped in the other direction. Balancing" is therefore necessary in commercial speech cases. Although commercial speech has speech value, it
50 Note, A Rationale of the Law of Aggravated Theft, 54 COLum. L. Rnv. 84,85
(1954) (footnote omitted).
51 See Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech. Economic Due Process and the
FirstAmendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1, 35 (1979). "If independent first amendment significance did exist in [commercial speech], it would also exist where the state has dedared the underlying transaction unlawful." Id.
52 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
S

Id. at 752.

Virginia Pharmacy has drawn sharp criticism. There are three main criticisms.
First, some critics argue that commercial speech promotes instrumental rather than
substantive values. See Baker, supra note 27, at 14. Thus, it "does not promote the
underlying values of the system [of free expression] as does other expression." Emerson,
First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CAxn. L. Rxv. 422, 459-61
(1980). Second, one may contend that the inclusion of commercial speech in the free
speech system "tends to dilute and devitalize first amendment doctrine." Id. Finally,
some object to Virginia Pharmacy on the ground that it incorporates economic due
process into the first amendment. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 783-84 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 51, at 30-31.
If Virginia Pharmacy was wrongly decided-if commercial speech has no speech
value-then blackmail proposing a legal transaction could be proscribed without further inquiry.
See Ely, FlagDesecration, 88 HAnv. L. Rxv. 1482, 1500-02 (1975); Nimmer,
The Right to Speak from Times to Time, 56 CAL. L. Rxv. 935, 938-48 (1968).
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remains unprotected when it has a low value and conflicts with important and valid legislative objectives.
When balancing in the realm of commercial speech, one must remember that Virginia Pharmacy protects the rights of listeners to hear
commercial speech. 55 The listener in a blackmail transaction is the person being blackmailed. It is counter-intuitive to talk about the listener's
interest in being blackmailed. The listener is the "victim" of blackmail,
the party blackmail statutes aim to protect. But the listener may prefer
blackmail to its alternative. 50 Balancing is therefore required to determine the validity of statutes proscribing blackmail that proposes a legal
act.
Commercial speech falls into three categories. First, the speech
may implicate a nonspeech constitutional right of the listener. Second,
the speech may propose a transaction that the legislature would not
outlaw totally, though it would have the power to do so. Third, the
speech may propose a transaction that the legislature means to outlaw
totally but has failed to do directly.
The listener's interest is greatest when the transaction involved in
the commercial speech implicates a nonspeech constitutional right of the
listener. A woman's right to information about abortion, for example,
weighs strongly. On the other side of the balance, the state has no legitimate interest in preventing a woman from exercising her right to abortion by preventing dissemination of relevant information (though it does
have a legitimate interest in preventing profiteering).57 Where the listener's nonspeech constitutional rights are implicated, commercial
speech protection should be at its maximum.5 8 In such a situation, justification or a restriction on speech should be difficult if not impossible.
When the legislature is empowered to outlaw a transaction en'5 See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text; see also Virginia Pharmacy, 425
U.S. at 781 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("the elimination of false and deceptive claims
serves to promote the one facet of commercial price and product advertising that warrants First Amendment protection-its contribution to the flow of accurate and reliable
information relevant to public and private decisionmaking").
" "[I]n many cases the person being blackmailed is willing to pay the asked price,
and far prefers paying the price to having the blackmailer expose him . . . . [t]he
'victim' may well be upset rather than grateful if his blackmailer is successfully prevented from offering him his services . . . ." Murphy, supra note 42, at 159.
67 See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). The asserted state interest in
"regulating what Virginians may hear or read about the [legal] New York [abortion]
services" was held entitled to "little, if any, weight." Id. at 827-28.
" See Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 HARv. L. REv.
1191, 1196 (1965) ("if a government cannot entirely prohibit the sale of a commodity,
the first amendment should permit truthful advertising of the commodity if there exist
reasonably effective alternative means by which the government could achieve the purposes for which the restriction is imposed").
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tirely but has decided not to do so, the listener's interest in learning
about the transaction may also be reasonably important. If the legislature would not outlaw the transaction because it is generally considered
to be beneficial, the listener has a valid claim to information about the
product. In Virginia Pharmacy, for example, the state legislature had
passed a statute declaring it unprofessional conduct for a licensed pharmacist to advertise the prices of prescription drugs. The legislature had
not outlawed the sale of drugs in competing, independent, privately
owned drug stores, and therefore, it should not have been permitted to
limit commercial speech so as to prevent effective competition. On the
other hand, when the transaction is generally considered to be harmful
but outlawing the transaction is problematic, limitations on commercial
speech may be more appropriate. "Thus, for example, the legislature
rationally might"conclude that the sale of cigarettes should be allowed
but that advertising should be banned to discourage new users."5 9
The listener's interest is lowest when the legislature intended to
outlaw the transaction, but the law was not properly framed to do so.60
The listener's interest rests solely upon the legislature's failure to accomplish what it intended. That interest seems .slight. Accordingly,
commercial speech restrictions in this context Should be given broad
permissible scope.
Blackmail statutes in states that have failed to outlaw the blackmail transaction fall into the final category. Lawmakers in those states
wished to prevent blackmail, and they had the power to do so; their
error was in not targeting the transaction. The listener's interest in
blackmail speech is accordingly small. First amendment protection for
such speech should be at its minimum, and it is outweighed by the
state's interest in protecting its constituents from the morally repugnant
blackmail transaction.

59 Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 51, at 35 (footnote omitted); see, e.g., 15 U.S.C.
§ 1335 (1976) ("it shall be unlawful to advertise cigarettes . . . on any medium of
electronic communication subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications
Commission"); Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney Gen., 405 U.S. 1000
(1972) (15 U.S.C. § 1335 upheld).
60 But see Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance in the
Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1163, 1182 (1970). Judge Linde argues that
the first amendment requires legislatures to aim at substantive evils, rather than speech.
It is not too much to ask lawmakers, if they believe that hateful expression
actually causes identifiable harm, to direct their laws against the causing
of such harm (laws which speech. . . may under some circumstances be
sufficient to violate), rather than to vent the public indignation by outlawing the expression itself.
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CONCLUSION

Although coercive speech analysis supports the validity of criminal
coercion provisions restricting speech that forces a listener's choice between two things to which the listener has a valid claim, it does not
support the validity of other criminal coercion provisions. Nor does it
support the validity of blackmail provisions corresponding to the latter
set of criminal coercion provisions. These blackmail provisions, however, are valid as restrictions on commercial speech. Blackmail laws accordingly have a broader permissible scope than criminal coercion laws.

